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Abstract
This paper ﬁnds an important relationship between the international food trade and cross-country in-
come and productivity differences. Poor countries have low labour productivity in agriculture relative to
othersectors, yetpredominantlyconsumedomestically-producedfood. Tounderstandtheseobservations,
I describe and exploit a general equilibrium model of international trade to: (1) measure sectoral produc-
tivity and trade costs across countries; and (2) quantify the impact of low poor-country food imports on
international income and productivity gaps. Speciﬁcally, I expand on Yi and Zhang [2010] and modify
an Eaton-Kortum trade model to incorporate multiple sectors, non-homothetic preferences, and labour
mobility costs. With this model, I estimate PPP-adjusted productivity from observed bilateral trade data,
avoidingproblematicpriceandemploymentdatainpoorcountriesthatdirectoutput-per-workerestimates
require. I ﬁnd reasonable trade barriers and labour mobility costs account for the low poor-country im-
ports despite their low productivity. Through various counterfactual experiments, I quantify how easing
import barriers and labour mobility costs increases imports and within-agriculture specialization, shuts
down low productivity domestic food producers, and lowers the gap between rich and poor countries. I
also ﬁnd an interaction between domestic labour-market distortions and trade barriers not found in the
existing dual-economy literature, which largely abstracts from open-economy considerations. Overall, I
account for one-third of the aggregate labour productivity gap between rich and poor countries and for
nearly half the gap in agriculture.
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The difference in agricultural labour productivity between rich and poor countries is large and accounts for
most of the aggregate income and productivity gap.1 Average labour productivity in agriculture, for example,
differ nearly by a factor of 70 between the poorest- and richest-10% of countries, but by only 6 in nonagri-
culture.2 Differences within agriculture drive differences in aggregate, since agriculture accounts for most
employment and spending in poor countries (see Figures 1a and 1b), and Schultz [1953] calls this the Food
Problem. Despite these productivity differences, Figure 2 shows the food import share of GDP rises with
income, implying poor countries do not generally substitute imports for low productivity domestic produc-
ers.3 This motivates existing literature to abstract from open-economy considerations and focus on domestic
distortions within closed-economy frameworks to understand agricultural productivity gaps. I depart from
this approach and show limited food imports itself inhibits structural change and lowers agricultural produc-
tivity in poor countries. There is also a quantitatively important interaction between domestic distortions
and trade barriers.4 Overall, I ﬁnd limited food imports and labour misallocation account for nearly half the
agricultural labour productivity gap between rich and poor countries, and a third of aggregate income and
productivity differences.
To demonstrate food imports have a ﬁrst-order contribution to aggregate productivity gaps between rich
and poor countries, I present a trade model consistent with stylized facts of development that builds upon Yi
and Zhang [2010].5 Speciﬁcally, I embed an augmented Ricardian trade model into a dual-economy (agricul-
ture vs. nonagriculture) model of structural change. The model incorporates horizontally differentiated and
tradable agricultural and manufactured goods, individually structured as in Eaton and Kortum [2002], and a
nontradable service-sector. Product differentiation within each tradable sector avoids counterfactual special-
1See, for example, Kuznets [1971], Kawagoe et al. [1985], Hayami and Ruttan [1985], Rao [1993], Gollin et al. [2004], Cordoba
and Ripoll [2006], Gollin et al. [2007], Adamopoulos [2010], Vollrath [2009], Adamopoulos and Restuccia [2010], Duarte and
Restuccia [2010], Lagakos and Waugh [2010].
2These results are for 2000 and utilize PPP-adjusted agricultural value added data from the UN-FAO. The aggregate difference
in this sample of 173 countries is 35. Restuccia et al. [2008] ﬁnd similar results: for 86 countries in 1985, the poorest 10% have
agricultural labour productivity 56 times lower than the richest 10%, but differ in nonagriculture by only 5. Caselli [2005] ﬁnds that
equalizing agricultural productivity across countries nearly eliminates all international income differences. Speciﬁcally, he ﬁnds the
90/10 ratio of aggregate income falls from 19 to 1.9 in a sample of 80 countries.
3As a fraction of food spending, rich country imports are an order of magnitude larger.
4Such interactions have been identiﬁed in other literature (see, for example, Kambourov [2009] and Artuc et al. [2010]) but
studies accounting for cross-country productivity and income differences typically abstract from such considerations.
5Yi and Zhang [2010] develop a multi-sector version of Eaton and Kortum [2002] and clearly link trade and structural trans-
formation. My contribution builds on their stylized treatment by quantitatively applying the framework to cross country. I also
incorporate nonhomothetic preferences and labour-market distortions.
1Figure 1: The Food Problem in Poor Countries
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ization patterns found in homogeneous goods frameworks and, importantly, allows for within-sector trade.6 I
exploit the Eaton-Kortum structure to infer sectoral labour productivity from observable trade data, avoiding
data limitations that prevent more direct measures.7 I also perform counterfactual experiments within the
fully calibrated model to highlight the importance of agricultural trade - or lack thereof - in accounting for
cross country income and productivity differences.
I focus on two distortions that limit food imports: high international trade barriers and costly labour
mobility. Trade barriers, such as tariffs, quotas, regulations, or poor infrastructure, increase import prices and
lead consumers to opt for lower productivity domestic producers. Costly labour mobility, such as regional
migration restrictions or scarce rural education, makes switching to non-agricultural activities difﬁcult for
farm labour, thereby increasing farm employment and decreasing farm wages.8 In fact, wages in agriculture
relative to non-agriculture increase strongly with a country’s level of development, and differ by a factor of
four to ﬁve in many poor countries. Low farm wages imply low output prices and consumers - again - opt
for lower productivity domestic producers over imports. Without these distortions, increased imports lead
low productivity producers to shut down and labour to concentrate in fewer agricultural varieties or switch
6Armington models, for instance, imply every country exports to every other country. The Eaton-Kortum structure allows many
producers of a product variety but each supplying different parts of the world. Within-sector trade ﬂows are necessary to investigate
specialization patterns within each sector, which relates sectoral productivity to import ﬂows.
7Data limitations lead most studies of cross-country sectoral productivity to focus on developed economies. Rao [1993], Restuc-
cia et al. [2008] are important exceptions, using FAO farm output prices to measure real agricultural productivity across countries.
8Vollrath [2009] shows wage gaps do not reﬂect sectoral differences in physical or human capital endowments. See Caselli and
Coleman [2001] for an exploration of the role learning costs play in structural change and, as a follow up, Tombe [2008] for how
such costs may interact with transportation costs in a larger set of US states. Cordoba and Ripoll [2006] ﬁnd schooling or migration
costs do not account for the sectoral labour productivity differences, but low quality of human capital in rural areas.
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to nonagricultural activities.9 Admittedly, I incorporate both distortions in a simple way and do not address
complex political-economy issues to explain why these distortions exist, such as balancing pressures between
rural and urban residents.
While agnostic about the causes, I can quantify the costs of these distortions independently of imple-
mentation and transition issues governments would face. Speciﬁcally, I investigate: (1) lowering import
barriers everywhere to the average level of the richest countries; (2) eliminating labour mobility costs; and
(3) both together. The two distortions have important interaction effects, with trade liberalization and im-
proved labour mobility together driving the largest reductions in cross-country differences. The aggregate
productivity gap between the richest- and poorest-10% of countries shrinks by 33% when both distortions
are reduced, but only 23% and 7% when import barriers and labour mobility costs are eased individually.10
These results are particularly important given the literature’s focus on domestic distortions alone.
Key to these results are cross-country productivity and trade cost estimates, which I infer from bilateral
trade data within the Eaton-Kortum structure of the model. To see how this inference is made, consider the
9Existing trade literature consistently ﬁnds exporting is associated with a reallocation towards more productive plants is a
quantitatively important component of overall productivity growth within the manufacturing sector. See Bernard and Jensen [2001],
Pavcnik [2002], Bernard et al. [2006].
10Rich and poor countries are the top and bottom deciles of GDP/Capita in 2000.
3following features of the global food trade between the 114 countries in my sample.11 For the bottom quartile
of countries, imports account for only 2% of food expenditures while imports are approximately 40% of food
spending in the top quartile. Poor countries source half of total food imports from rich countries but very
little from other poor countries.12 Similarly, rich countries source the majority of their total food imports
from other rich countries. While I present precise productivity and trade cost estimates from thousands of
importer-exporter ﬂows in Section 3.1, the intuition is straightforward. I infer high labour productivity for
a country if other countries import a disproportionately high share from that country. I infer high import
barriers if overall import shares are below the model’s prediction, given a country’s productivity.13
For concreteness, consider trade between the United Kingdom, Cuba, and Canada. Both the UK and
Cubaallocateapproximately1.4%oftheirfoodspendingtoimportsfromCanada. Ontheotherhand, Canada
allocates 1% of its spending to imports from the United Kingdom but only 0.2% to imports from Cuba. The
model infers low Cuban productivity from Canada’s low share. Given Cuba’s low productivity, imports are
an attractive alternative to domestic production. In the data, however, Cuba imports a similar share to another
- higher productivity - country, the United Kingdom. The model infers high Cuban import costs from Cuba’s
lower than predicted import share. Overall, I consider over 6,000 trade pairs in agriculture and over 9,000 in
manufacturing to estimate that imports costs for the poorest-10% of countries are approximately 43% more
in agriculture than the average country, compared to 41% less than average for rich countries.14 Labour
productivity estimates suggest rich countries are over 100 times more productive in agriculture than poor
countries, and over 70 times more in manufacturing.15 Non-tradable services productivity is calibrated so
the baseline model aggregate matches data, resulting in a factor of 10 difference between rich and poor.
11The precise data used and approach taken to estimate expenditure shares, both domestic and foreign (by source), is similar to
Bernard et al. [2003]. I use the NBER-UN Trade Database for the year 2000. I provide details in Section 3.1.
12The remaining imports are from the middle-income countries. For more on the low South-South trade levels, see Linder
[1961], Markusen [1986], Feenstra [1988], Hunter [1991], Echevarria [2000], Fieler [2010]
13The procedure I employ to infer productivity and trade costs from observable trade ﬂows, within the Eaton-Kortum framework,
is broadly consistent with a large trade literature that I discuss brieﬂy (see, for example, Eaton and Kortum [2001], Costinot et al.
[2010], Levchenko and Zhang [2010], Waugh [2010]. For an alternative mapping of bilateral import share patterns to productivity
and trade costs presented by Waugh [2010] will be investigated in Section 6.4
14To place the importer-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects in context, note that Waugh [2010] ﬁnds a -62% ﬁxed-effect for the United States’
manufacturing goods trade. My results suggest -76% for manufacturing and -55% in agriculture. Details will follow in Section 3.1.
Overall, the trade weighted average import costs across all bilateral trading partners for the 114 countries in my sample is 263% in
both agriculture and manufacturing. For rich countries, this number is 104% on average in agriculture and 78% in manufacturing.
For comparison, Anderson and van Wincoop [2004] report tariff-equivalent US trade costs of 170%.
15Agriculture’s relative labour productivity is low in poor countries, consistent cross country productivity comparisons in the
macro literature. This does not imply poor countries have comparative advantage in manufacturing, as in a pure Ricardian frame-
work, since labour market distortions lower farm wages. Relative productivity to wages in agriculture is higher in poor countries
than rich. This is consistent with a Heckscher-Ohlin interpretation: poor countries are abundant in unskilled labour (or land) used
intensively in farming.
4Unlike direct estimates, labour productivity inferred from observed trade ﬂows avoids using producer
price and labour input data, which are problematic for most developing countries. For certain years, industry-
level producer prices among OECD countries are available through the Groningen Growth and Development
Centre [Inklaar and Timmer, 2008]. For developing countries, only expenditure prices, not producer prices,
are available through the World Bank’s International Comparisons Project (ICP). Productivity estimates from
expenditure prices will be biased for two reasons: (1) distribution margins are systematically related to a
country’slevelofdevelopment[Adamopoulos,2008]; and(2)expenditurepricescapturemanymanufactured
and service components of consumption, such as packaging or preparation. With these limitations in mind,
Duarte and Restuccia [2010] study structural change and productivity growth over time in OECD economies
with model-implied sectoral productivity estimates; their approach, however, requires accurate employment
data. For many developing countries, standard surveys overestimate farm labour since rural residents and
farm workers are treated synonymously [Gollin et al., 2004].16 For these reasons, I estimate productivity
revealed through observed bilateral trade patterns.17
I contribute to a large international macroeconomics literature on agriculture’s role in development.18
This literature focuses on causes of low agricultural productivity and explanations vary from inefﬁcient farm
sizes [Adamopoulos and Restuccia, 2010], poor domestic transportation infrastructure [Adamopoulos, 2010,
Gollin and Rogerson, 2010], comparatively low quality farm workers [Lagakos and Waugh, 2010], barriers
to labour or intermediate inputs [Restuccia et al., 2008], or just over-counting farm workers in the data
[Gollin et al., 2004]. Trade, however, substitutes for the lowest productivity farms to meet subsistence food
requirements, increasing average sectoral productivity as they shut-down. My study is not the ﬁrst to link
trade to structural change. Stokey [2001], for example, ﬁnds food imports account for the United Kingdom’s
reduction in agricultural output between 1780 and 1850, and for much of the increased manufacturing.
More recently, Teignier [2010] demonstrates a similar pattern for South Korea since the 1960s, although
agricultural subsidies and tariff protection limited reallocation and subsequent productivity growth. Rather
than investigate time series growth patterns as in these papers, I quantify to what extent the lack of food
16Brandt et al. [2008] and Brandt and Zhu [2010], for example, use household-level surveys to infer a 26% agricultural labour
share in 2007 rather than the ofﬁcial ﬁgure of 41%, when considering hours spent on farm work. Moreover, Gollin and Rogerson
[2010] report that even in extremely poor rural areas of Uganda, over 40% of households are active in non-agricultural activities,
mainly wholesale and retail trade and manufacturing.
17I recognize the trade data is not perfect. For example, shipments valued at less than $100,000, which represent approximately
1% of the transactions, were manually incorporated into the UN trade data by Feenstra et al. [2005]. To the extent this adjustment is
not exhaustive, I will not be able to capture small scale trade that is likely more important for trade between developing countries.
18Timmer [1988, 2002] provide an effective summary. Matsuyama [1992] and, more recently, Lucas [2009] highlight dynamic
gains from labour reallocation, with learning-by-doing in manufacturing. This paper focuses on static gains to structural change.
5imports can account for the current cross-sectional level differences.
The model’s dual-economy features closely follow recent structural change research, which examines
the strong negative correlation between agriculture’s share of output and employment and the overall level
of economic activity. In particular, I model non-homothetic preferences as in Kongsamut et al. [2001]. Con-
sumers must satisfy a minimum food intake requirement before allocating income across goods according
to their preference weights.19 In addition, to capture large wage differences between agricultural and nona-
gricultural activities in poor countries observed, I incorporate labour market frictions. This further increases
agriculture’s share of employment in poor countries. Labour market frictions are used by Caselli and Cole-
man [2001] in a dynamic model to explain the development experience of the Southern US and by Restuccia
et al. [2008] to capture cross-country patterns. Given the static nature of this paper’s model, I adopt Restuc-
cia et al. [2008]’s approach. Speciﬁcally, farm workers face a cost to switch into nonagricultural activities,
proportional to non-farm wages.
The model’s trade components follow a large literature based on Eaton and Kortum [2002].20 This
framework is particularly well suited to estimate productivity from trade ﬂows. Of particular relevance to this
paper, Costinot et al. [2010] and Levchenko and Zhang [2010] infer productivity and comparative advantage
using a similar framework, but only for manufacturing. Waugh [2010] studies trade ﬂows and the impact
of trade on cross country income differentials, but - again - only for manufacturing.21 My model is distinct
in two important ways. First, to capture declining food expenditure shares, consumer preferences are non-
homothetic. Fieler [2010] also employs non-homothetic preferences within an Eaton-Kortum framework
but my approach differs by linking low income elasticity to the good with a high degree of international
productivity variation - namely, agriculture. Fieler [2010] considers the opposite case, which may be more
relevant between manufactured goods than between agriculture and non-agriculture broadly.22 The second
distinct feature in my model, labour mobility costs, captures large farm-nonfarm wage differences in poor
19This contrasts with Ngai and Pissarides [2007]’s approach, where differential productivity growth across sectors, coupled with
an elasticity of substitution different from one, generates structural change. Other approaches involve increasing consumer goods
variety [Greenwood and Uysal, 2005, Foellmi and Zweilmueller, 2006] or capital deepening with sector-speciﬁc factor intensities
[Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2006]. Incorporating non-homothetic preferences is the most natural approach for this paper.
20For recent studies utilizing a similar framework, see Bernard et al. [2003], Alvarez and Lucas [2007], Caliendo and Parro
[2009], Kerr [2009], Burstein and Vogel [2010], Chor [2010], Costinot et al. [2010], Donaldson [2010], Fieler [2010], Levchenko
and Zhang [2010], Waugh [2010], Yi and Zhang [2010].
21My ﬁndings are robust to alternative speciﬁcations of the bilateral trade-cost function. I reproduce my results using an exporter
(as opposed to importer) speciﬁc trade costs speciﬁcation. See, for example, Waugh [2010] on the role of export costs within this
class of models. I ﬁnd evidence the type of trade cost asymmetry found by Waugh [2010] for manufactured goods trade is also a
feature of the agricultural goods trade.
22Additionally, she uses modeling features to generate variable budget shares in a fundamentally different manner from the
Stone-Geary preferences I use in this paper.
6countries. The model’s remaining features are standard: perfectly competitive markets, trade arises through
sectoral and international technology differences, and labour as the only productive input.
2 A Model Consistent with Stylized Facts
This section presents the general equilibrium trade model that builds on Yi and Zhang [2010]. Overall, the
environment is composed of N countries each with three sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, and services.
I incorporate standard dual-economy features found in the macroeconomics literature: (1) non-homothetic
preferences and (2) labour market distortions between agriculture and nonagriculture. This preference struc-
ture captures Engel’s law: food expenditure shares decline dramatically with income. The labour market
distortions capture large sectoral wage differences and high labour mobility costs in poor countries. To in-
corporate open-economy considerations, agriculture and manufacturing are composite goods composed of
individually tradable and horizontally differentiated varieties. Each variety is sourced from the lowest cost
producer, whether at home or abroad, which introduces within sector trade (exporting a subset of varieties to
import others). Between sector trade is also available, where a surplus of exports over imports in agriculture,
for example, allows for a net import of manufactured goods. Importantly, this structure does not imply per-
fect specialization and it links trade patterns to sectoral productivity and trade costs. I conclude this section
by deﬁning an equilibrium and by describing a solution procedure for wages and labour allocations.
2.1 Households’ Problem
I index countries by i = 1;:::;N, and each is populated by Li agents endowed with an inelastically sup-
plied unit of labour, allocated between the three sectors. Within each country, households spread consump-
tion evenly across individual agents. I model non-homothetic preferences as subsistence food requirements










Preference weights fea;em;esg determine the fraction of disposable income allocated to each type of good.
Consumer demands are standard: Cia = ¯ a+ea ˜ MiP 1
ia ,Cim =em ˜ MiP 1
im ,Cis =es ˜ MiP 1
is , where ˜ Mi is household




 Pia ¯ a. As food subsistence requirements increase -
through a higher ¯ a - food’s share of total expenditures increases.
2.2 Production Technology
I model N-by-N bilateral trade ﬂows with two differentiated tradable goods, agriculture and manufacturing,
similar to Eaton and Kortum [2002]. Goods, denoted k 2 fa;mg, are composed of a continuum of differen-
tiated varieties. Firms produce individual product varieties, denoted z, with linear technology23
yik(z) = Aik(z)Lik(z):
Markets are perfectly competitive, which implies the producer price will equal marginal costs,
wik
Aik(z). More
speciﬁcally, eachvarietyisacontestablemarketwithzerobarrierstoﬁrmentryorexit; so, anypricedeviation
from marginal costs will result in a new entrant supplanting the incumbent ﬁrm. Productive technologies for




where qk governs productivity dispersion and Aik the overall level of productivity, with Aik µ E[Aik(z)].24
Lower q implies greater variability in productivity across ﬁrms and countries and higher A implies greater
average productivity. These productivity differences across producers provides the incentive to trade: low
productivity domestic producers may be shut down in favour of an import. For lower q, the incentive to
trade, and the gain from doing so, increases.
Let ˜ yik(z) be the quantity of variety-z in country-i for good-k, either imported or produced domestically.










23Incorporating intermediate inputs into this production function is another standard formulation, which increases trade gains
as input prices decline. To be conservative, I abstract from this consideration in the baseline results but report the case with
intermediates in the appendix.





. This relates to the scale parameter of a Frechet distribution. lik = A
qk
ik .
8Finally, nontradable services are produced with a similar linear production technology,Yis = AisLis:
2.3 International Prices and Trade Patterns
Firms producing the composite manufactured and agricultural good purchase individual varieties from the
lowest cost source - at home or abroad. As in Samuelson [1954], trade costs are iceberg: tijk sector-k goods
are shipped per unit imported by country-i from country-j. To avoid shipments through third-party countries,
the triangle inequality holds: tij < tihthj, for any country h. Consequently, the price of variety-z in country-i
for good-k is the lowest price charged by producers,
wjk













Given the distribution of productivity across varieties, and assuming import costs and wages are not variety-




















good-k and no knowledge of individual variety sources is necessary.26
The share of country-i expenditures sourced from country-j capture trade patterns in the model. This
share, in turn, depends on the fraction of varieties produced in j that have the lowest price of all producers
in any other country, from the perspective of country-i consumers. As in Eaton and Kortum [2002] the share












qk as the product of trade costs and competitiveness of country-j from the per-
251+qk > r must hold, I set r such that g = 1, which does not violate this restriction.
26In order to perform proper PPP-adjustments to labour productivity across countries, individual variety price and quantity
information is required. To that end, I will numerically simulate the full model on 50,000 product types. I report details later in
the paper and in the appendix. Unadjusted labour productivity from the model’s analytic solution is a good approximation to the
PPP-adjusted values.
9spective of country-i consumers. Ajk=wjk is a country’s competitiveness, which rises with technological
productivity Ajk and falls with labour costs wjk.
2.4 Labour Market and Trade Balance Conditions
Trade shares combine with household demand to determine each country’s total sales. Country-j spends
pjik fraction of its total consumer demand on output of good-k from country-i, which implies total foreign
demand is åj6=iLjPikCikpjik. Since country-i spends piik fraction on its own output, total demand for country-
i output of good-k is then å
N
j=1LjPikCikpjik. With labour as the only productive input, total sectoral revenue
from all sources - foreign and domestic - equals labour income by sector for each country:





Lj(Pja ¯ a+ea ˜ Mj)pjia

; (6)








wisLis = PisYis = es ˜ MiLi: (8)





Also, sectoral labour allocations must total to national employment,
å
k2fa;m;sg
Lik = Li 8 i = 1;::;N: (9)
I capture labour market distortions with a reduced-form wedge between sectoral wages.27 Speciﬁcally,
wia = xiwi and wim = wis = wi, where xi < 1 captures labour’s cost to move off the farm.
The sectoral revenue and labour earnings conditions of the previous section imply international trade
balances for each country. Speciﬁcally, combine Equations 6 to 8 with labour market clearing Equation 9









Lj[(Pja ¯ a+ea ˜ Mj)pjia+em ˜ Mjpjim] 8 i = 1;::;N: (10)
Country-i appears on both the left and right side, so this equation is identical to imports equaling exports.
27I abstract from how these differentials are supported in equilibrium. See Lagakos and Waugh [2010] for an excellent treatment
of the relationship between sectoral labour frictions and the food problem.
10Alternatively, this condition states that total spending on tradable goods by country-i consumers will equal
total global spending on tradable goods produced by country-i ﬁrms.
2.5 Equilibrium Deﬁnition and Solving the Model







i=1 and labour allocations fLia;Lim;Lisg
N
i=1 such that (1) given prices and wages,
households solve Equation 1; (2) given wages, price aggregates are consistent with Equation 4; (3) given
wages, prices, and labour allocations, international trade balances through Equation 10; and (4) labour mar-
kets clear through Equation 9.
Given exogenous parameters (technology, Aik; trade costs, tijk; preference weights, ek; subsistence re-
quirements, ¯ a; labour mobility costs, xi; total employment, Li; and trade elasticities, qk), one can solve for
wages and labour allocations as follows. First, combine prices from Equation 4 and trade shares from Equa-
tion 5 with Equations 6 through 8. Wages and labour in agriculture, manufacturing, and services is a set
of 4N unknowns. Equations 6 through 8, with the labour market clearing Equation 9, is a set of 4N equa-
tions. Thus, equilibrium wages and labour allocations, given exogenous parameters, solves this system.2829
I solve counterfactual experiments in Section 5 using this procedure. Technology and trade costs parameters,
however, are not observable and I describe their calibration in Section 3.
3 Calibrating the Model
To guide intuition through the calibration, I ﬁrst describe the overall approach before moving into details.
First, estimate competitiveness
Aik
wik and trade costs tijk from bilateral trade ﬂows (details in Section 3.1).
These estimates together imply prices from Equation 4 and trade shares from Equation 5. Given prices
28Interestingly, wage levels and labour shares are independent of service-sector labour productivity. To see this, note that if






, where e is
the tradable goods’ budget share. In this framework, the elasticity of substitution across goods is one (from household preferences)
and, therefore, budget shares are constant. Thus, this system of equations determines wages across countries, given technology and
trade costs. These wage equations are similar to Equation 21 in Eaton and Kortum [2002], which corresponds to their special case
of immobile labour. More general preferences, however, would imply fea;em;esg are functions of an overall price index and, by
extension, productivity in every sector, including services.
29Not allowing for trade imbalances will impact model wage estimates, since countries with large current account deﬁcits would
have higher wages than in the balanced-trade case. In terms of productivity estimates, imposing trade balance will underestimate
productivity dispersion if rich countries typically have current account deﬁcits. For poor countries, the impact will be negligible,
given their low import shares. Dekle et al. [2007] incorporated into an Eaton-Kortum framework and ﬁnd most wage estimates
under imbalanced trade are within 10% of the balanced-trade case. They ﬁnd imposing trade balance results in US wages of about
10% higher than with a current account deﬁcit.
11and trade shares, determine international disposable income levels ˜ Mi to balance international trade from
Equation 10. Given income and prices, consumer demands from the household problem imply wages and
labour allocations consistent with international demands and income levels through Equations 6 and 8. The
product of competitiveness
Aik
wik and wages now implies sectoral technology parameters Aik. Importantly,
I infer sectoral labour productivity from bilateral trade ﬂows with minimal structure. The Eaton-Kortum
trade structure within agriculture and manufacturing generates trade patterns independently of household
preferences and trade balance conditions. Wage levels depend on trade balance and household preferences
but are independent of service-sector labour productivity.
Finally, I construct PPP-adjusted aggregate productivity in the model following similar procedures as in
the data. Given the three-sector structure of the model, PPP-adjusted GDP/Worker is total nominal consumer
expenditures deﬂated by a country-speciﬁc Geary-Khamis price index. This procedure follows the World
Bank’s International Comparisons Program and represents how Penn-World Table measures of GDP/Worker
comparable across countries would be constructed in a world with only three goods [Heston et al., 2009]. To

















j=1LjCjk is a quantity (of total con-
sumption) weight for country-i and good-k. The common set of international prices to value consumption is
essentially a weighted-average of goods prices across countries. The model’s PPP-adjusted GDP/Worker for
country-i is thenYi=Li = PPP 1
i åk2fa;m;sgPikCik:
For the quantitative exercises, I use a set of 114 countries, listed in Table 12. A number of parameters
can be set to generally accepted values in the literature; namely, the preference parameters and the Frechet
12Table 1: Calibration of Model Parameters
Parameters Target Value
fqa;qmg Cost-Elasticity of Trade Flows f7;7g
fes;em;eag Long-Run US Employment Shares f0:75;0:24;0:01g
Ais Aggregate GDP/Worker Data Country-Speciﬁc
xi Relative Wage Data Country-Speciﬁc
Li Total Employment Data Country-Speciﬁc 
Aia;Aim;tija;tijm
	
Bilateral Trade Data Country-Speciﬁc
¯ a US Sectoral Employment Data 0:0160
This table provides a list of model parameters that must be calibrated. All other variables in the model are
endogenously determined. The parameters in the bottom two rows are dealt with in detail as Stage 1 and Stage
2, all other parameters either map to observable data or are generally accepted values. Long-run employment
shares reﬂect the values to which US employment data appear to be converging. I report sensitivity of the model
to various alternative values of fqa;qmg in Section 6:1.
distribution’s dispersion parameter. In order: ea = 0:01, em = 0:24, and es = 0:75; and, qa = qm = 7.30 Total
employment is inferred from PWT6.3 as the ratio of total GDP to GDP/Worker. I list the model parameters,
their values, and calibration targets in Table 1. The following sub-sections describe parameterizing produc-
tivity, trade costs, subsistence level of food consumption, and, ﬁnally, labour market distortions. Given these,
all other variables are endogenously determined. I proceed in stages: (1) estimate competitiveness and trade
costs to ﬁt bilateral trade, independently of the structure of the household sector supporting such ﬂows in
equilibrium; (2) select subsistence parameter to match US data; and (3) set service-sector labour productivity
so the model’s aggregate labour productivity matches data.
3.1 Productivity and Trade Costs
The empirical strategy relates variation in bilateral import and export ﬂows, relative to each country’s do-
mestic purchases, to infer import barriers, export competitiveness, and bilateral trade costs. The share of



















(see Section 3.1) on a measure of trade costs, tij, from the CEPII trade database, along with importer
and exporter ﬁxed effects, yields q = 5:5 in agriculture and q = 6:8 in manufacturing. For colonial India, Donaldson [2010] ﬁnds
q = 3:8 with the 17 agriculture varieties for which he has data, but q = 5:2 with the entire sample of 85 commodities. Lower theta
in agriculture enhances my results by increasing the scope for comparative advantage within agriculture. To be conservative, I set
qa = qm. For other estimates, Alvarez and Lucas [2007] set q = 6:67, Eaton and Kortum [2002] set q = 8:3, and Anderson and
van Wincoop [2004] reviews the literature and ﬁnds anything between 5 and 10 reasonable. Finally, Waugh [2010] ﬁnds q = 7:9
for OECD countries and q = 5:5 for non-OECD countries, which is identical to my estimate for agricultural trade. All development
accounting and trade ﬂow counterfactual exercises are robust to alternative values (see Section 6.1).
13where Tjk = Ajk=wjk is a country’s competitiveness, which rises with technological productivity Ajk and





of pijk to piik is a normalized import share that depends only on competitiveness measures (productivity per


















To estimate this expression, proxy trade costs with various bilateral characteristics and an importer-speciﬁc
trade barrier, Bik. The bilateral costs include distance between capitals and indicators for shared border, com-
mon (ethnographic) language, and trade agreement status.3132 Importer-speciﬁc trade barriers is a reduced-
form approach to capture all import costs such as tariffs, non-tariff barriers, health regulations, low quality
local infrastructure, information asymmetries, among many others, in a single number. Importantly, trade
costs in this setup are asymmetric between countries: it is more expensive to import goods from Canada into
Cuba than from Cuba into Canada. Alternative frameworks, such as in Anderson and van Wincoop [2003],













where hjk is the exporter ﬁxed-effect, dik the importer ﬁxed-effect, and nijk the random component. The
model parameter estimates are derived from coefﬁcient estimates as: ˆ Tik = eˆ hik=q, ˆ Bik = e (ˆ dik+ˆ hik)=q, and










To ﬁt trade shares pijk to data, I construct trade share measures similar to Eaton and Kortum [2001],
Bernard et al. [2003]. Speciﬁcally, I take the ratio of country-i imports from country-j, reported in the
31Data on pairwise characteristics and Capital coordinates are from CEPII. http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
Distance between importer-i and exporter-e: 6378:7arccos(sin(late)sin(lati)+cos(late)cos(lati)cos(longi longe))
32I ﬁnd the trade agreement variable particularly important for European bilateral pairs. Without this control, productivity
inferences for these countries, given their high levels of trade, are extremely large. Data is from Fieler [2010].
33Asymmetric costs are not excluded from their framework, but it only identiﬁes the average of any country-speciﬁc costs
between members of a pair.





Shared Border 0.574 0.472
(0.105) (0.098)
Shared Language 0.664 0.596
(0.061) (0.052)
Trade Agreement 0.354 -.323
(0.124) (0.122)
Exporter FEs Yes Yes
Importer FEs Yes Yes
Observations 6207 9014
R2 0.971 0.971
The OLS esimates of Equation 11. The dependent variable is the normalized import share, for
importer-exporter pairs from the NBER-UN trade database, for each traded sector. Data on distance,
borders, and language from CEPII; trade agreement indicator from Fieler (2010).




I infer sectoral output from World Bank GDP shares.34 Bilateral trade data for 2000 is from the NBER-UN
Trade Database, which disaggregates by 4-digit SITC code.35 Agricultural trade ﬂows are all bilateral ﬂows
classiﬁed with an SITC 1-digit code of 0, such as 0573 (Bananas, Fresh or Dried). Finally, countries do not
trade with every other country, leaving zeros in the data for those pairs. For my baseline estimates, I estimate
the above speciﬁcation only on the pairs with positive trade with OLS.36
The basic gravity-speciﬁcation implied by the theory captures the trade data well. The parameter esti-
34Gross output measures are ideal but I lack internationally comparable measures. The FAO reports gross and net production
values (PPP-adjusted, while trade ﬂows are exchange-rate adjusted) and I ﬁnd a gross-to-net ratio of approximately 5% among
developing countries, compared to 15% for the rich. Net output inferred from GDP shares underestimates home-bias in poor
countries, so this approach is conservative. Consistent with my treatment in the manufacturing sector, I use the inferred net output
measure for agriculture as well.
35See Feenstra et al. [2005] for details regarding the construction of this data.
36As a robustness check, to handle this left-censoring of the data, I estimate a Tobit model with the minimum observed pij for
each country-i serving as the lower limit, below which statistical agencies do not observe the trade. This procedure is similar, but
not identical to, [Eaton and Kortum, 2001]. See Anderson and van Wincoop [2003] for more on estimating gravity models. The
censoring threshold for pij is selected as the maximum likelihood estimate ¯ pi = minj2[1;::;N]pij, such that if the true pij < ¯ pi then I
will not observe a trade ﬂow in the data for that i; j pair. The geographic component of trade becomes much more important within
the Tobit structure. I explore this alternative speciﬁcation in the appendix.
15Figure 3: Fit of the Stage-1 Calibrated Model
(a) Agricultural Trade




























































































































Displays the ﬁt of the Stage-1 calibrated trade ﬂows in the model to the data for each traded goods sector. The normalized trade ﬂow measure
is the share of consumer expenditures imported from abroad relative to the share sourced domestically. The vertical axis is the model normalized
import rate and the horizontal axis is calculated from the NBER-UN trade database.
mates are listed in Table 2, with 6,207 observed trade pairs in agriculture and 9,014 in manufacturing. To
visualize the goodness of ﬁt, I sum
pijk
piik within countries for each sector, which represents the relative impor-
tance of goods sourced from abroad relative to domestic purchases. The actual and ﬁtted values (summed in
similar fashion) are found in Figure 3 and match extremely well.
My estimates of sectoral competitiveness, ˆ Tik, imply rich countries have a comparative advantage in
manufacturing and an absolute advantage in both sectors while poor countries have a comparative advantage
in agriculture. I report means for the richest and poorest countries in Table 3. On average, rich country
competitiveness in manufacturing is 2.4 times poor country competitiveness but only 1.6 times more in agri-
culture. This does not contradict earlier observations of larger labour productivity differences in agriculture
than manufacturing since farm wages are signiﬁcantly lower than nonfarm wages in poor countries.37 For
all countries, I plot the competitiveness estimates ˆ Tik in Figures 13 and 14.
When the model is solved, Frechet productivity parameters are Aik = ˆ Tikwik. Finally, I plot the trade costs
captured by the importer-speciﬁc ﬁxed effect ˆ Bik in Figures 11 and 12. Note that these ﬁxed-effects can be
37The price of agricultural goods relative to manufacturing, from ICP, is also consistent with this ﬁnding. The ratio Pa=Pm is 0.8
in the bottom quintile of countries and nearly 1 for the top. Overall, the relative price of food within the set of tradable goods is
U-shaped across countries, with middle income countries having the lowest Pa=Pm ratio.
16Table 3: Selected Values from Stage-1 Calibration
Mean for Competitiveness, ˆ  
Ajk=wjk

Trade Cost, Importer Fixed-Effect, ˆ Bik
Countries in: Agriculture Manufacturing Agriculture Manufacturing
Top-10% 1.44 2.65 -41% -68%
Bottom-10% 0.89 1.09 43% -1%
Competitiveness and importer-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects implied by the bilateral pattern of sectoral trade. These results suggest rich countries have
a comparative advantage in manufactured goods and an absolute advantage in both. Poor countries also face higher costs to import goods. Negative
values for ˆ Bik imply imported goods cost less than in the average country.
below zero, which implies imports cost less than in the average country.38
3.2 Subsistence, Service Sector Productivity, and Labour Market Distortions
An important driver of agriculture’s high employment and spending share in lower income countries is the
need to fulﬁll minimum food intake requirements. To capture this channel, without selecting subsistence
to target potentially suspect employment data in poor countries, I set ¯ a to match US data. Speciﬁcally,
Equations 6, 7, and 10 imply labour income in the tradable sectors must equal consumer expenditures on








. Normalize w = 1 for the US and combine with household
demands and labour market clearing conditions to yield











To evaluate this expression, I use: prices from the previous section, which depend only on the trade cost and
competitiveness estimates; preference weightsfes;em;eag; labour shares fls;lm;lag = f0:743;0:232;0:026g,
from the World Bank’s 2000 WDI; and US labour mobility costs ˆ xUS = 0:8972, estimated from wage data.
I get ¯ a = 0:0160 and subsistence spending, Pa ¯ a, of less than 1% aggregate GDP/Worker for the United
States - approximately $600 per year. For comparison, Restuccia et al. [2008] ﬁnd a subsistence value of
approximately 2.2% of the US aggregate GDP/Worker in 1985.
Two parameters remain. I set service sector labour productivity, Ais, so the model implied PPP-adjusted
aggregate labour productivity matches data. Finally, each country’s labour market distortion, xi, can be
matched to sectoral wage data from the International Labour Organization.39 Wage data is unavailable for
38This interpretation was provided by Waugh [2010], who ﬁnds a -62% ﬁxed-effect for the United States’ manufacturing goods
trade. My results suggest -76% for manufacturing and -55% in agriculture.
39http://laborsta.ilo.org/
17Figure 4: The Role of Subsistence Food Requirements
(a) With Subsistence Food Requirement Set to Match US Data


















(b) With Subsistence Food Requirements Set to Zero


















Displays the model implied share of employment in agriculture along the vertical axis relative to the share reported for 2000 in the World
Bank’s WDI database. The left panel is the model with subsistence set to match US data. The right panel is the model with subsistence set to zero.
Targeting US data allows the model to capture much of the cross country variation. All else equal, the sum of squared deviations between the model
and data is 8.18 with subsistence set to match US data and 17.1 with subsistence set to zero.
many countries. I use the observed relationship between relative agricultural wages and GDP/Worker to ﬁt
xi for each of the 114 countries. Details on this procedure are in the Data Appendix.
4 Results from the Baseline Calibration
I display the model-implied agricultural employment share in Figure 4a. For the richest and poorest coun-
tries, I present each sector’s employment share and the relative GDP/Worker in Table 4. The model corre-
sponds well to sectoral data, despite explicitly targeting only aggregate productivity differences. If cross-
country employment data are accurate, targeting US data accounts for approximately half of the international
variationinagriculture’semploymentshare. Formanydevelopingcountries, however, standardsurveysover-
estimate farm labour since rural residents and farm workers are treated synonymously. Brandt et al. [2008]
and Brandt and Zhu [2010], for example, use household-level surveys to infer a 26% agricultural labour share
in 2007 rather than the ofﬁcial ﬁgure of 41%, when considering hours spent on farm work. Moreover, Gollin
and Rogerson [2010] report that even in extremely poor rural areas of Uganda, over 40% of households are
active in non-agricultural activities, mainly wholesale and retail trade and manufacturing. For these reasons,
I proceed using the model-implied employment shares.
18Table 4: Aggregate Productivity and Employment Shares, Model vs. Data
Mean of Bottom-10% Mean of Top-10%
Data Model Data Model
GDP/Worker, Relative to Top * 0.04 0.04 1 1
Agricultural Employment Share 0.67 0.45 0.04 0.02
Manufacturing Employment Share 0.08 0.13 0.29 0.23
Services Employment Share 0.25 0.42 0.67 0.75
 denotes target. This table compares the model to data for various statistics.
4.1 Trade Cost Estimates
I decompose trade costs into bilateral components (distance between trading partners and separate indicators
for shared border, language, and trade agreement), importer-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects, and an idiosyncratic com-
ponent that is IID across products. These ﬁxed effects capture many possible barriers: tariffs, quotas, health
regulations, or poor local road networks. Adjusting this variable downwards to the typical level observed in
rich countries will be a key counterfactual experiment I perform to determine the impact of low food imports
on international productivity and income differences.
Figures 11 and 12 display the trade cost estimates for both sectors. I separately plot the overall measure
(trade weighted across import sources) and the importer-speciﬁc ﬁxed effect. In the ﬁgures, I represent trade
costs by their impact on prices: a trade cost of t will increase prices by 100(et=q  1) percent. The average
import costs for the 114 countries in my sample is 263% in both agriculture and manufacturing. For rich
countries, this number is 104% on average in agriculture and 78% in manufacturing. The importer-speciﬁc
ﬁxed component of trade costs average 43% for poor countries and -41% for rich countries in agriculture.
This implies that imports are typically 43% more expensive in the poorest 10% of countries relative to the
average country.40
4.2 Sectoral Labour Productivity
As noted by Costinot et al. [2010], Waugh [2010], Yi and Zhang [2010], Ajk is the labour productivity in
autarky. With trade, labour productivity in sector-k is given by the conditional mean of operating producer
40See Section 6.3 for a discussion on the plausibility of these trade cost estimates.
19Table 5: Baseline Model: Cross Country Productivity Differentials
Top-10% / Bottom-10% Variance of Logs
Sector Data Model Data Model
Aggregate 23.0 23.0 1.00 1.00
Agriculture 79.5 103.9 1.73 2.14
Manufacturing - 77.4 - 1.99
Services - 9.9 - 0.75
Nonagriculture 5.8 13.8 0.78 0.47
Presents the baseline estimates of sectoral productivity implied by bilateral trade ﬂows and model
wages. Services sector productivity is calibrated so the model aggregate productivity matches the dis-
persion of GDP/Worker in the PWT6.3. Agricultural labour productivity in the data is PPP-adjusted
value-added per worker using net farm output data from FAO, valued at international prices, for 1999-
2001. The precise procedure follows Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) and Caselli (2005).
productivity, yik =
wik
Pik = E[Aik(z) j z 2 fyik(z) > 0g], can be expressed as
yik = p
 1=qk
iik | {z }
 Aik | {z }
Trade Technology
: (12)
In autarky, all producers operate and labour productivity is Aik. Imports, which lower piik, leads average
productivity to grow as inefﬁcient producers shut-down.41 Absent a very low piik, measured labour pro-
ductivity will closely reﬂect the underlying technology parameter, Aik. This corresponds to recent literature
ﬁnding low gains from trade in new-trade models (see, for example, Arkolakis et al. [2009]). The counterfac-
tual gains I ﬁnd in Section 5 follow from poor-country piik declining signiﬁcantly. The import-elasticity of
labour productivity within a tradable sector is, from the above expression, 1=qk. The value for qk inﬂuences
the liberalization experiments I will perform in the next section. I will report sensitivity of my results to
various values for qk and I ﬁnd the overall conclusions robust.
I plot relative productivity between agriculture and manufacturing in Figure 9; relative agricultural labour
productivity increases with a country’s level of development. In the ﬁgure, I separately show the pure tech-
nology ratio Aai
Ami and the full observed productivity ratio, given trade selection.
Unfortunately, the model is unable to analytically produce PPP-adjusted estimates of sectoral labour
productivity since individual variety producer-prices and production quantities are unknown. To provide
proper comparisons with data, I simulate the model on a set of 50,000 products for each sector and country.
41See Costinot et al. [2010] for a detailed discussion of the extent to which selection impacts observed productivity.
20Within the simulation, I track individual producer prices and quantities to construct PPP adjustment-factors
following the World Bank procedures. Overall, productivity estimates from Equation 12 match appropriate
PPP-adjusted estimates very well. In fact, The agricultural and manufacturing productivity gaps in the sim-
ulation are 102.4 and 73.2, respectively.42 Overall, the correlation between the two measures are 0.997 in
agriculture and 0.987 in manufacturing. Going forward, I report sectoral results from Equation 12 and leave
further discussion of sectoral-level PPP-adjustments to the appendix.
Table 5 displays the aggregate and sectoral productivity dispersion implied by the baseline model, which
match the data well for agriculture. I plot a complete comparison for all countries in Figure 10. Nonagricul-
tural productivity variation, however, is larger than data suggests, reconciled by the model’s lower agricul-
tural employment share. Similar comparisons within the manufacturing and service sectors across a broad
range of countries are difﬁcult for lack of producer price data. Broadly speaking, however, lower service-
sector productivity variation than in tradable goods sectors is consistent with Herrendorf and Valentinyi
[2010].43
While direct international comparison is problematic, I examine a subset of countries for which real
labour productivity (per hour) exists in the GGDC Productivity Level Database [Inklaar and Timmer, 2008].
I ﬁnd the variance of log manufacturing productivity is 1.42 in the model for these countries and 0.19 in
services, while GGDC ﬁgures are 0.53 and 0.16.44 Moreover, the ratio of the 75th to 25th percentile is 7
in the model and 3 in the GGDC data. An alternative trade cost speciﬁcation in Section 6.4 provides less
variation in productivity estimates. The counterfactual results in the following section are robust - indeed,
strengthened - by this alternative speciﬁcation, so I continue with the baseline model.
5 Counterfactual Experiments: Trade, Productivity, and Income
To account for the sources of productivity gaps between rich and poor countries, I perform a set of coun-
terfactual experiments within the model. Speciﬁcally, I investigate: (1) lowering importer ﬁxed-effects, Bik,
to the average level of the richest-10% of countries for both sectors; (2) allowing full labour mobility by
setting xi = 1 for all i; and (3), to capture interactions between the domestic and foreign distortions, both (1)
42Standard errors from 20 iterations are 0.8 and 7.
43For an interesting illustration of the difﬁculty of making direct cross-country productivity comparisons, especially within the
service-sector, see Baily and Solow [2001]
44I use the GGDC ﬁgures corresponding to manufacturing less electrical equipment and services less postal and telecommuni-
cations. Electrical equipment, postal, and telecommunications are aggregated into a single, separate category.
21Table 6: Trade Between 1st and 4th Quartiles
(a) Baseline Model
Import Share from: Domestic
Poor Rich Share
Poor 9% 47% 98%
Rich 2% 74% 62%
(b) Counterfactual: Lower Importer Fixed-Effects
Import Share from: Domestic
Poor Rich Share
Poor 25% 23% 33%
Rich 10% 47% 42%
Displays the fraction of total imports by source-country income levels. Poor are the bottom quantile of countries in terms of GDP/Capita and
rich are the top. Large shares imported from Rich countries does not imply that rich countries export more food to poor countries than vice-versa
(in fact, the reverse is true). Prior to liberalization, poor countries bought very little from each other. Following liberalization of import and labour
markets, food trade between poor countries rises dramatically. The fraction of varieties domestically produced also falls to one-third its original
value. This Ricardian-selection is the source of the increased sectoral productivity. I show the shares across all income percentiles for both poor and
rich importers in Figures 15 and 16.
and (2) together. Following each of these experiments, poor countries increases their level of food imports
dramatically (see Figures 5, 6, and 7). Imports allow the lowest productivity domestic producers to shut
down and tradable-sector productivity increases, especially in poor countries. I interpret the portion of the
rich-poor gap that these counterfactual experiments eliminates as the contribution of the two distortions. I
present details in the following sections.
5.1 International Food Trade Flows
I present the bilateral trade patterns for the trade liberalization experiment in Table 6. I show the shares
across all income percentiles for both poor and rich importers in Figures 15 and 16. Until subsistence
food requirements are met, poor country consumers allocate signiﬁcant resources to agriculture since trade
barriers inhibit their ability, and internal labour markets reduce their incentive, to import food. Following
liberalization, the fraction of varieties produced domestically falls below that of rich countries. The fraction
of food imports sourced from other poor countries more than triples and the fraction from rich countries falls
in half. Middle-income countries (see Figures 15 and 16) also become an important source for poor-country
food imports. I ﬁnd some developing countries increase their resource commitment to agriculture while
others move labour into non-agricultural activities. In essence, poor countries more efﬁciently allocate their
food production among themselves. The counterfactual volume of South-South trade grows by an order
of magnitude to account for nearly one-ﬁfth of global agricultural trade, and together with North-South
trade accounts for slightly more than half (see Figures 17 and 18). These counterfactual trade patterns drive
important changes in productivity and income differences between rich and poor countries.
22Table 7: Results of Main Counterfactual Experiments
Liberalization Experiments
Liberalized Mobile
Baseline Trade Labour Both
Labour Productivity Top-10%/Bottom-10%
Aggregate 23.0 17.7 21.5 15.3
Agriculture 103.2 88.5 98.3 57.5
Manufacturing 77.4 47.0 78.4 52.8
Agriculture in the Poorest-10%
Employment Share 0.45 0.37 0.33 0.03
Change in Labour Productivity - 17% 6% 60%
Import Share of Expenditures 0.03 0.67 0.24 0.96
Displays the rich-poor productivity gaps and various statistics for the poorest-10% of countries. Speciﬁcally, the share of employment in
agriculture, the share of consumer spending on food, and the share of spending allocated to imports. The biggest reduction in cross country produc-
tivity differences results from liberalizing trade in the presence of costless labour mobility. Liberalized-trade involves lowering both agricultural and
manufacturing import barriers. Import barriers are lowered to the average for the richest ten-percent of countries, by sector. Mobile labour involves
eliminating between-sector wage differences.
Importantly, despite low relative labour productivity, the counterfactual trade ﬂows following reduction
of import barriers conﬁrm an earlier ﬁnding: poor countries have a comparative advantage in agricultural
goods. The fraction of total exports accounted for by agricultural goods rises in poor countries by more than
in rich. I report each country’s percentage point change in agriculture’s share of total exports in Figure 19.
5.2 Cross-Country Productivity Gaps
Table 7 displays model-implied gaps in sectoral and aggregate productivity across countries, under various
measures and experiments. Reducing import barriers and allowing costless labour mobility results in dra-
matic reductions in productivity gaps. The richest 10% of countries initially had aggregate productivity 23
times the poorest but those same countries were only 15 times as productive after both distortions were re-
laxed. The agricultural productivity gap for these countries is nearly cut in half, from over 103 to 58. The
reduction in log aggregate productivity variation is also signiﬁcant. While not displayed, nearly all the ag-
gregate gains found in the broader liberalization experiments remain when only agricultural import barriers
are reduced. This is intuitive, given the importance of the agricultural sector for poor country consumers
resulting from subsistence food requirements.
Together, these results suggest that nearly one-third of the gap between rich and poor countries can
23be accounted for by the lack of food imports. There are also interaction effects between domestic and
foreign (trade) distortions. Initially, the difference between the richest and poorest 10% of countries is 23.
Lowering import barriers lowers the gap to 17.7, labour mobility barrier reductions lower the gap to 21.5,
combined the gap falls to 15.3. This implies 23% of the observed gap is from high import barriers alone,
7% from costly labour mobility alone, but 33% from both distortions together. The reduction in cross-
country income variation reveals a similar pattern. The variance in log GDP/Worker across all countries in
the sample falls by 7% following trade liberalization, 5% following labour mobility improvements, and 17%
following an improvement in both distortions. The contribution of both distortions is greater than the sum of
their individual contributions. This result is particularly important given the literature’s focus on domestic
distortions within closed-economy frameworks.
5.3 Decomposition: Cross Country Aggregate Productivity and Income Variation
Given technology levels, I decompose aggregate productivity changes into two broad channels: (1) Ricardian
trade selection and (2) structural change. Selection occurs because of low productivity domestic producers
shutting down with increased import levels. Recall Equation 12, yik = p
 1=qk
iik Aik, deﬁnes sectoral labour
productivity, which changes inversely with the domestic expenditure share. To determine the contribution
of trade selection in the reduction of aggregate productivity differences, I re-estimate the trade liberalization
counterfactual holding sectoral labour allocations ﬁxed at their initial levels.45 I display the results in Table
8. The aggregate productivity gap falls to 20.9 - instead of 17.7 - when labour allocations are ﬁxed. This
indicates Ricardian trade selection accounts for nearly half (40%) the contribution of import barriers to
international productivity differences.
That productivity differences within sectors shrinks following liberalized trade and labour markets is
an important point to emphasize. Trade models with horizontally differentiated goods and heterogeneous
productivity across ﬁrms can account for Ricardian selection while homogeneous goods frameworks cannot.
It also suggests that many of the inefﬁcient production technologies employed in low-income countries -
such as small farm sizes - may be abandoned if access to imports improves. To reiterate, however, I am not
advancing a speciﬁc policy recommending. Accounting for within-sector changes is important to quantify
the contribution of low imports and labour misallocation to observed income and productivity differences
45The labour mobility improvements are not relevant in this case, since xi = 1 implies labour allocations are not relevant for
aggregate productivity.
24Table 8: Counterfactual Aggregate Productivity Gaps, with Fixed Labour Allocations
Labour Productivity Top-10%/Bottom-10%
Liberalize Liberalize Trade
Baseline Trade with Fixed Labour
Aggregate 23.0 17.7 20.9
This shows aggregate productivity for the richest-10% of countries relative to the
poorest-10%. I restimate the trade liberalization counterfactual holding sectoral labour
allocations ﬁxed at their initial levels. This shows that approximately half (40%) the
contribution of import barriers on aggregate productivity differences operate through Ri-
cardian trade selection.
Table 9: Contribution to Productivity Gaps, Various q
q = 7 q = 5 q = 10 qa = 5:5
qm = 6:8
Aggregate 33% 60% 27% 46%
Agriculture 44% 44% 46% 47%
Manufacturing 32% 42% 24% 32%
Displays thecontribution to productivity gapsbetween rich and poorcountries of bothimport and labour mobility
distortions for various values of the productivity dispersion parameter q. I report the baseline value of 7 in the ﬁrst
column, followed by 5 and 10 to reﬂect the range suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). The ﬁnal column
reports for the values of q implied by using CEPII trade costs to proxy tij (see footnote 30). Excluding Niger results in
lower contributions to aggregate productivity gaps, since Niger’s labour allocation is highly sensisitive to trade costs.
The alternative values are 23%, 27%, 21%, and 27%, respectively.
across countries.
6 Discussion and Robustness of Results
6.1 Alternative Values for q
The import-elasticity of labour productivity within a tradable goods sector is 1=q. My baseline result is
that the two distortions contributes to one-third of the observed differences in aggregate labour productivity
between rich and poor countries. They further contribute to nearly half the difference within agriculture and
one-third in manufacturing. I repeat the experiments for various values of q to ensure my results are robust.
I report the alternative contributions in Table 9. Overall, the headline result varies between 27% and 60%
depending on the value of q, with the baseline value yielding conservative results.
256.2 Alternative Counterfactual Experiments
I investigate a more limited experiment involving reducing import-barriers in only the poorest-10% of coun-
tries by ﬁfty percentage points and improve poor-country labour markets only until xi = 0:8. The wage
wedge implied by this value of x corresponds to an urban/nonagricultural unemployment rate of 20% and
no rural/agricultural unemployment in the Harris and Todaro [1970] framework.46 I display the results of
this experiment in Table 10. The reduction in the gap between rich and poor is, as expected, much less than
previous experiments. The magnitudes, though, are still impressive given the limited liberalization among
only the poorest-10%. The gap between the richest and poorest falls by more than 18% (from 23 to 18.8) in
aggregate and by nearly 20% within agriculture (from 103 to 84).
I perform three more counterfactual experiments to illustrate the behavior of the model. To isolate
food trade in particular, I liberalized trade within the agricultural and manufacturing sectors separately. In
these scenarios, the aggregate labour productivity gap falls to 15.8 when agricultural trade is liberalized, in
conjunction with fully mobile labour, but only to 21 in the case of manufacturing trade liberalization. I report
the results of these two experiments in Table 10. Finally, I examine the productivity and income response to
a full liberalization of labour markets and international trade. Speciﬁcally, I set xi = 1 for all countries and
tij = 1 for all trading pairs (i; j) for both sectors. I report the results of this experiment in Table 11. The
average growth in aggregate real GDP/Worker amongst the poorest countries of my sample is 120% under
frictionless trade, and 160% when labour mobility costs are also zero. For rich countries, the aggregate gains
are approximately 30% under both scenarios. The resulting gap in labour productivity between rich and poor
countries falls nearly in half in aggregate and by two-thirds in agriculture. Of course, this exercise merely
illustrates the model’s behavior, since removing all trade costs is not feasible.
6.3 Plausibility of Trade Cost Estimates
The country-speciﬁc import costs suggest nearly a one hundred percentage point difference between rich
and poor countries. These results are plausible, given the voluminous contributions to trade costs beyond
tariffs and transport costs that often cannot be directly measured (see Anderson and van Wincoop [2004]).
Traditional measure of trade costs can account for much of the estimate. First, observed WTO average
tariff rates are larger in poorer countries, on the order of 20% for agricultural imports under MFN. Tariff
46To see this, the agricultural wage wa will equal the expected nonagricultural wage wn. The unemployment rate reﬂects the
probability of not securing employment at a given wage. So, wa = un0+(1 un)wn ) wa
wn = 1 un, which equals 0:8 if un = 0:2.
26Table 10: Counterfactual Productivity Gaps, Various Experiments
(a) Limited and Unilateral Liberalization in Poorest-10% of Countries
Liberalization Experiments
Liberalized Mobile
Baseline Trade Labour Both
Labour Productivity Top-10%/Bottom-10%
Aggregate 23.0 22.7 21.3 18.8
Agriculture 103.2 101.0 98.2 83.8
Manufacturing 77.4 55.8 78.3 60.1
(b) Reduce Agricultural Import Barriers Only
Liberalization Experiments
Liberalized Mobile
Baseline Trade Labour Both
Labour Productivity Top-10%/Bottom-10%
Aggregate 23.0 17.5 21.5 15.8
Agriculture 103.2 85.0 98.3 57.2
Manufacturing 77.4 78.1 78.4 78.8
(c) Reduce Manufacturing Import Barriers Only
Liberalization Experiments
Liberalized Mobile
Baseline Trade Labour Both
Labour Productivity Top-10%/Bottom-10%
Aggregate 23.0 23.6 21.5 21.0
Agriculture 103.2 105.4 98.3 99.0
Manufacturing 77.4 45.8 78.4 50.2
This shows productivity for the richest-10% of countries relative to the poorest-10% for various alternative counterfactual experiments.
The top panel: Liberalized-trade involves lowering both agricultural and manufacturing import barriers in the poorest-10% by ﬁfty percentage
points. Mobile labour involves setting x = 0:8 in poor countries. Even this limited and unilateral liberalization results in an 18% reduction in the
aggregate labour productivity gap between rich and poor countries.
The middle and bottom panels: trade liberalization is for only agriculture (middle panel) and for manufacturing (bottom panel) separately. Mobile
labour in both cases involves zero mobility costs (xi = 1). The largest reductions come from liberalizing agricultural goods trade.







Aggregate 23.0 14.3 12.6
Agriculture 103.2 60.0 32.0
Manufacturing 77.4 28.7 32.0
This shows productivity for the richest-10% of countries relative to the poorest-10%. I restimate the model under
perfectly free trade (tij = 1 for all (i; j) pairs) and, in addition, under zero labour mobility costs (xi = 1).
costs go beyond average values, since variation across substitutable products matters nearly as much. Kee
et al. [2008], accounting for tariff variation across products and the different product elasticities imply trade
restrictiveness47 is 64% larger than average tariff rates imply. Large distortions from product-line tariff
variation is also found for the United States by Irwin [2010], with a uniform tariff-equivalent estimate of
75%. Next, many studies ﬁnd non-tariff barriers of roughly equal importance (and often more important)
for a country’s level of restrictiveness Kee et al. [2009]. A host of other trading difﬁculties exist for poor
countries that increase trade costs. Contracting costs and insecurity, poor local distribution infrastructure,
information gathering costs, currency controls, local content regulations, or health regulations in the case of
food. Distribution costs are no doubt a signiﬁcant driver of trade costs for poor countries, with such costs
already on the order of 50% for rich countries.
6.4 Implications for Price Differentials
Agricultural and manufacturing prices in the model decline with income. ICP data for 2005, however,
suggest price levels in these traded goods sectors are increasing with income. Moreover, the relative price of
agriculture to non-agricultural goods in the model is rising with income but strong declining with income in
the ICP data. Since model-prices capture the full price involved in purchasing goods, including transport to
the point of consumption, some of the differences may be illusory. Given low infrastructure quality in poor
countries, these concerns may be signiﬁcant. However, one should not even take ICP prices at face value.
FAO farm-gate prices, on the other hand, which I display in Figure 20, suggests far higher agricultural prices
in poor countries than ICP suggests. Putting this point aside, and taking ICP price estimates as given, an
47Trade restrictiveness is the uniform tariff rate that generate identical dead-weight loss as a particular tariff/NTB structure
28alternative speciﬁcation of trade costs allows the model to more closely match ICP-implied price levels.
6.4.1 Exporter-Speciﬁc Trade Costs
I redo the analysis under the alternative form of trade cost asymmetry suggested by Waugh [2010]; specif-
ically, country-speciﬁc export costs rather than import costs.48 The World Bank’s Doing Business Index
surveys the cost of exporting an identical shipment of goods from a variety of countries and displays a clear
decline in such costs with income. Poor country export costs are perhaps twice that of rich. If exporter-costs
are included only with the manufacturing sector, the baseline dispersion of productivity across countries
shrinks to 24 (from 77). Counterfactual experiments in this environment yield even greater reductions in ag-
gregate productivity since poor country manufacturing sectors - to which farm labour will reallocate - have
higher productivity. If exporter-costs are imposed on both sectors, the productivity gap is 50 in agriculture
and 30 in manufacturing. In this case, import barriers and labour misallocation still account for nearly 20%
of the aggregate gap between rich and poor. I conclude that my results are largely robust to my choice of
trade cost asymmetry and provide more detailed results, with speciﬁc Tables and Figures, in the appendix.
6.5 OECD Agricultural Producer Support
Support programs for the agricultural sector in higher-income countries are large. The OECD estimates
producer support estimates as high as 60% of production in Korea and Japan, 31% in the European Union,
22% in Canada, and 11% in the United States.49 My main productivity estimates, Aia, capture producer
supports. Previous counter-factual exercises apply if PSE levels remain unchanged. Removal of support
results in lower poor-country imports and higher rich-country imports. I present details of this experiment in
the appendix and I ﬁnd all main results robust.
6.6 Actual Development Experiences
Finally, this paper’s counterfactual experiments suggest food imports facilitate structural change and devel-
opment. Two notable historical experiences are broadly consistent with this claim. First, between 1780
and 1850, the United Kingdom experienced massive reallocation of labour off the farm at the same time as
48I use the agricultural trade data and 2005 ICP prices to show asymmetric trade costs identiﬁed by Waugh [2010] for manufac-
tured goods is also a feature of the agricultural goods trade. For example, it is generally most costly for the United States to import
food from developed economies than for developing countries to import food from the US. Perhaps export subsidy programs may
play a role here.
49Source: Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries 2009: Monitoring and Evaluation.
29food imports rose. Technological change in the manufacturing sector and the declining cost of important
inputs, such as power and transportation, increased manufacturing productivity. Were higher trade volumes
the result of higher manufacturing productivity or vice-versa? Stokey [2001] argues increased food imports,
independent of technical change, accounts fully for the reduction in domestic food production and approxi-
mately half of real wage growth.
South Korea since the mid-1960s provides a second historical episode where increased food imports
may have facilitated structural change and increased aggregate productivity and income. The FAO Food
Balance sheets for South Korea show products accounting for over 75% of calorie consumption - cereals
and starchy-roots (potatoes, etc.) - were nearly all domestically produced in the early 1960s. By 2000,
imports were twenty-seven times their 1961 quantity (nearly 9% growth per year) and more than double
domestic production. Tariffs for some of the most important imported goods, such as Wheat, are as low as
3% (applied, and 9% bound). Consequently, South Korea’s employment share in agriculture fell from over
50% to less than 10%. The remaining domestic production has become increasingly concentrated in fewer
varieties, with rice alone accounting for more than 50% of cultivated land.50 Teignier [2010] concludes food
imports facilitated reallocation and productivity increases, though to a smaller extent than possible given
large support programs - among the highest in the world - for domestic farmers.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship between the international food trade and differences in labour produc-
tivity between rich and poor countries. A large literature ﬁnds labour productivity differences within the agri-
cultural sector accounts for nearly the entire aggregate productivity gap. To understand these within-sector
differences, existing studies focus on domestic distortions within closed-economy frameworks. Instead, I
describe and exploit a general equilibrium model of international trade to: (1) measure sectoral productivity
and trade costs across countries from observed import and export ﬂows; and (2) quantify the impact of low
poor-country food imports on international income and productivity gaps. Speciﬁcally, I expand on Yi and
Zhang [2010] and modify an Eaton-Kortum trade model to incorporate multiple sectors and standard fea-
tures from the macroeconomics literature - namely, non-homothetic preferences and labour mobility costs.
With this model, I estimate PPP-adjusted productivity without producer price or employment data. This
50Source: South Korea Agricultural Policy Review, Vol. 5 No. 1. Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada.
30is particularly important for developing countries, where agricultural employment estimates are overstated
[Brandt and Zhu, 2010, Brandt et al., 2008, Gollin et al., 2004] and systematic non-agricultural producer
price estimates are unavailable. I ﬁnd agricultural labour productivity differs by a factor of 100 between rich
and poor countries, more than in manufacturing and much more than in services.
Despite low agricultural productivity, poor countries import very little of their food. I focus on two dis-
tortions to account for the low food imports: high international trade barriers and costly labour mobility.
Trade barriers increase import prices and labour mobility frictions increase farm employment and decrease
farm wages. Both distortions lead consumers to opt for lower productivity domestic producers. Counterfac-
tual experiments within the calibrated model determine how much of the productivity and income differences
between rich and poor countries are due to limited food imports and labour misallocation. Liberalization of
domestic labour markets and lowering import barriers shut-down low productivity domestic producers and
facilitates labour reallocation out of unproductive agricultural varieties. More speciﬁcally, both specializa-
tionwithinagricultureandtradebetweendevelopingcountriesincreasedramatically. Fewerfarmworkersare
also required and the resulting labour reallocation further increases aggregate productivity in poor countries.
In addition, I ﬁnd an interaction between domestic labour-market distortions and import barriers, with both
distortions together accounting for more cross-country productivity differences than each separately. Over-
all, low food imports and labour misallocation accounts for half the agricultural productivity differences
between rich and poor countries and a third of the aggregate differences.
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35A Tables and Figures
Table 12: Relative Productivity and Trade Estimates
Country Real GDP/Worker Relative Ag. Home Bias Home Bias Ag Import Nonag Import
(PWT 6.3) Productivity in Ag in Nonag Barrier Barrier
ALB 7590.271 .39115682 .96141678 .69874883 116.23558 35.421284
ARE 66576.617 .44485646 .61258745 .42578775 -18.620369 -53.892677
ARG 28930.211 .58822697 .92331129 .81713331 -31.249567 -54.02153
ARM 9728.3887 .48998314 .98607594 .93895686 52.866177 38.422016
AUS 60072.863 .57381749 .68545008 .54253531 -50.1661 -65.197693
AUT 65356.531 .43096933 .4135825 .21421564 -20.688431 -58.447227
AZE 8344.5225 .3909446 .95296329 .93601954 58.564125 11.980983
BDI 1484.5964 .3851738 .9966318 .9570998 35.336205 47.586834
BGD 4014.1082 .30144984 .99489081 .91947263 43.869297 -24.635656
BGR 15948.272 .40791327 .95872879 .60820246 26.421473 -31.066128
BHR 43883.574 .45361263 .37662947 .62962717 -14.125608 -41.283718
BHS 48276.43 .57115817 .44156331 .27013373 -23.095102 -33.775581
BIH 11547.183 .37477651 .87371927 .73112261 73.309517 15.562359
BLR 25513.055 .44623926 .98642498 .9683097 91.117615 25.764761
BLZ 21620.295 .73690593 .83211309 .79179543 -19.825785 -3.4059961
BOL 7833.9316 .42441931 .95463169 .86706454 31.046803 -13.168035
BRA 17660.801 .47839239 .94823343 .85341001 -24.6385 -58.092987
BRB 40506.512 .62988985 .88369179 .81707412 25.189732 2.0579891
CAN 60726.898 .52735758 .17978513 .10846359 -54.533997 -69.607185
CHL 36284.004 .568097 .83947229 .77406633 -28.651699 -52.482285
CHN 7559.1113 .27769059 .99373788 .90127778 5.4443336 -63.081043
CMR 6600.2842 .40258005 .98312026 .90316433 32.569183 -7.6996498
COL 13745.382 .52220678 .94951999 .85174996 .21882121 -36.463806
CRI 22434.385 .65378511 .91839951 .74750924 -18.682486 -34.551842
CUB 16589.055 .73064089 .90199858 .95611066 -15.214612 7.4105468
CYP 43011.164 .54910803 .60781217 .30474305 -3.2015181 -28.692625
CZE 31778.24 .40388408 .78479379 .45648283 -1.8401186 -46.059528
DOM 18871.377 .57409 .94462961 .83033311 13.785944 -6.762392
DZA 14551.485 .24858868 .8226999 .88474596 70.361885 -27.203905
ECU 12178.112 .63464582 .80907476 .83972847 -28.973389 -25.910892
EGY 15739.912 .42501581 .97270417 .89575201 42.46011 -22.299734
ESP 55540.348 .47999349 .69178373 .52950901 -32.949368 -63.288963
ETH 2001.5085 .34709328 .99612582 .9237144 43.246174 4.3161197
FRA 61215.82 .42952317 .47984272 .2127251 -46.736046 -74.542259
GAB 19198.613 .40116626 .85290688 .7041955 22.552519 -27.402355
GBR 55386.16 .47294986 .19167638 .30696738 -51.370808 -70.356552
GEO 8629.6055 .4205569 .97356004 .92317873 56.330154 11.483145
GER 60376.449 .45014486 .1989603 .23394805 -52.131054 -74.166313
GHA 3109.5029 .36462086 .98229206 .75973243 21.250496 -16.157288
Continued on next page...
36... table 12 continued
Country Real GDP/Worker Relative Ag. Home Bias Home Bias Ag Import Nonag Import
(PWT 6.3) Productivity in Ag in Nonag Barrier Barrier
GMB 2867.2598 .26624116 .90920943 .61966658 36.30434 -16.088514
GRC 48963.172 .53542763 .79882061 .54401541 -8.650218 -47.199192
GTM 19613.189 .8248201 .98411417 .84365767 4.647737 -9.9256105
GUY 5755.3135 .470209 .9320249 .79902595 10.763121 -14.257613
HND 8106.8535 .57012063 .97656822 .79237938 6.1110044 -17.688372
HRV 21563.98 .47247696 .86566246 .589167 27.8923 -9.1185513
HUN 32281.992 .45421082 .84972095 .25820506 -12.490937 -45.643238
IDN 8827.8955 .31406319 .97858161 .91279435 -4.1200795 -56.2113
IRN 24279.256 .47311798 .96224785 .90294707 13.080079 -31.706249
ITA 65438.621 .43283814 .62625158 .45005322 -34.368046 -70.017349
JAM 17163.977 .46379858 .90370435 .65703332 7.1718373 -29.846788
JOR 16173.863 .4016206 .48802936 .6774441 14.357027 -19.893681
JPN 53166.207 .31194833 .57334828 .61662436 -31.655426 -72.500595
KAZ 15065.728 .41171774 .959952 .8687017 11.999783 -34.486782
KGZ 7831.019 .41997975 .9946304 .93580574 90.92321 18.829765
KHM 3811.2412 .24670576 .99335039 .7234664 124.21813 -15.165354
KOR 39495.418 .28960797 .84103942 .45653099 -6.4119534 -71.588135
LAO 3883.1799 .37166846 .99248093 .78021073 63.206375 6.1703076
LBY 42501.613 .49303922 .77914327 .88688254 17.761953 -9.0768642
LKA 10848.017 .49249989 .97575247 .83043873 -3.3311014 -28.865454
LTU 17925.152 .42437679 .81858528 .51731342 15.331088 -16.681107
LVA 17569.195 .36693966 .75201631 .28633946 18.558769 -29.939064
MAR 13006.281 .45928419 .927104 .74079555 3.4475424 -32.662697
MDA 5778.0376 .36736712 .97938186 .74590325 64.000237 9.0598278
MDG 2116.3748 .30560085 .98440021 .7474438 16.96875 -22.301098
MEX 26379.596 .393978 .81716233 .36352396 -14.011316 -59.917614
MKD 15400.013 .43038976 .89876306 .66855162 54.501045 7.944171
MLI 4272.3198 .30154476 .98487151 .85884619 67.92749 -7.9862909
MNG 4949.4604 .32729781 .96017265 .60031152 37.980572 -11.134032
MOZ 2643.6362 .36331731 .97207379 .86094666 32.287895 3.2383001
MRT 5089.9858 .44948477 .91180551 .77724105 -10.426609 -17.935457
MUS 34345.426 .62497592 .83736217 .79004896 -5.9959579 -19.806093
MYS 33878.715 .39930263 .1155616 .09930795 -52.302139 -73.056992
NER 2440.2144 .26194119 .98998141 .86838865 100.86871 18.319036
NGA 4234.168 .23728889 .9738096 .82959747 43.586437 -41.20121
NIC 5743.2651 .54447824 .9832809 .81121922 9.5045967 -6.6013904
NPL 4679.5435 .37024894 .99880934 .9483645 104.91924 18.450016
OMN 64533.863 .56666619 .48471743 .45963252 -20.699299 -41.747982
PAK 9059.4248 .35754877 .99065626 .88874733 35.617798 -36.012218
PAN 16515.746 .39707556 .87120342 .13788819 -20.300501 -55.828621
PER 11026.101 .48054996 .91168296 .81760824 -17.149261 -42.004776
PHL 9777.0186 .34894532 .95292133 .61925316 5.1450987 -49.129383
PNG 5147.5142 .38255289 .97337526 .77683401 22.000086 -16.372852
POL 23813.854 .45402408 .8617813 .65672165 -10.345575 -39.855751
Continued on next page...
37... table 12 continued
Country Real GDP/Worker Relative Ag. Home Bias Home Bias Ag Import Nonag Import
(PWT 6.3) Productivity in Ag in Nonag Barrier Barrier
PRT 38223.16 .4306064 .60384381 .42459369 -14.400739 -53.67141
PRY 10000.54 .45730346 .9551084 .74019635 49.548306 -16.345976
ROM 11892.55 .3478418 .95351768 .73561662 30.557854 -34.01915
RUS 16792.43 .33892775 .90989524 .90612638 -6.7339177 -49.172535
SAU 57897.566 .35190997 .76930201 .80598259 11.971082 -46.539055
SDN 5175.5542 .36969495 .9942534 .91511351 61.522282 -8.2719154
SLE 3026.7737 .2853317 .99199003 .89181894 95.976143 15.57388
SLV 13053.375 .60670823 .96081477 .83843374 15.87324 -13.850939
SUR 22195.484 .55933756 .90996349 .72771931 1.5714281 -22.388821
SVK 24524.709 .39087147 .79760838 .44502318 17.925068 -33.120319
SVN 38960.258 .3969709 .64999944 .27385515 11.000682 -41.536098
SYR 8355.4863 .39964205 .94422925 .76356459 20.058931 -24.974756
TGO 2544.9956 .27694082 .96148098 .61944824 20.037184 -23.952509
THA 12530.275 .38763082 .92903525 .64243913 -32.958405 -63.073338
TJK 6530.2212 .44627711 .97833043 .97203553 20.12665 12.346147
TKM 20911.957 .43660912 .99226308 .96496046 93.682884 20.936636
TTO 33820.656 .57613021 .54945815 .75556767 -21.91465 -23.144445
TUN 22505.564 .41643357 .9370814 .63800621 33.481415 -29.153522
TUR 18381.109 .41552803 .97293139 .65911072 3.6455681 -51.358505
TZA 1376.3237 .25590083 .99364263 .81406415 34.848835 -19.801512
UGA 2519.8564 .42649615 .99762428 .95553136 48.702965 33.835415
UKR 12087.757 .31721985 .98681301 .88269752 57.582664 -28.444921
URY 24083.666 .64031476 .82175672 .71544683 -21.733906 -37.96516
USA 77003.289 .49307323 .67464781 .58444643 -54.888073 -76.028572
UZB 3857.9875 .28255773 .98547316 .84358966 40.940517 -23.165609
VEN 25604.17 .42014474 .84088588 .82016724 .2384045 -41.836048
VNM 4914.9805 .35769731 .98893237 .83897406 2.478817 -38.810883
YEM 5050.4082 .32764158 .79635417 .84302258 15.492043 -19.490442
ZAF 23749.947 .4343161 .89864075 .76840812 -23.157085 -54.141731
ZMB 2729.6191 .26534802 .9891625 .66928852 51.460373 -19.407759
ZWE 10903.287 .45615458 .99608648 .88828504 53.36005 -11.625922
38Figure 5: Normalized Import Shares: No Import Barriers


























































Display result of setting import barriers to the average level in rich-countries. Poor country normalized import
shares increase slightly more than rich. The resulting normalized import share is unrelated to income. Dots represent
countries with a quadradic best-ﬁt line also illustrated.
Figure 6: Normalized Import Shares: No Labour Mobility Costs





























































Display result of removing labour mobility costs, xi = 1, in all countries. Poor country normalized import shares
increase as a result. Dots represent countries with a quadradic best-ﬁt line also illustrated.
39Figure 7: Normalized Import Shares: No Import Barriers or Labour Mobility Costs



























































Display result of removing both labour mobility costs, xi = 1, and setting import barriers to the average of rich-
country levels. Normalized import shares increase more in poor countries than rich. Dots represent countries with a
quadradic best-ﬁt line also illustrated.
Figure 8










3 Change in GDP/Worker, Post−Liberalization









































Both Trade and Labour Liberalization
40Figure 9: Real Output-per-Worker in Agriculture Relative to Manufacturing
















Figure 10: Agricultural Labour Productivity, Model Estimates vs. Data




































41Figure 11: Trade Cost Estimates for Agricultural Goods
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42Figure 12: Trade Cost Estimates for Manufactured Goods
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S is below median GDP/worker
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46Figure 19: Increased Share of Agriculture in Total Exports Following Trade Liberalization
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Plots the (FAO Relative Prices / ICP Relative Prices)
Ratio of FAO Producer Prices to ICP Expediture Prices (Food)
47